In this paper, I examine the attempt to apply proportionality balancing (PB) to the coordination of the relations between governance regimes, which I call 'inter-scalar PB', from the perspective of competing institutional arrangements of global governance. Observing of inter-scalar PB becoming a legal technique of management, I argue that it be reconceived as a narrative framework within which the fundamental values and principles of individual governance regimes can be politically contested without antagonism. I first discuss the role PB has played in the interaction between the law of state immunity and international investment law and then take a closer look at the features of inter-scalar PB as intimated in those instances: simplism, normativism, institutionalism, and legalism. I suggest that the complex fundamental issues concerning the relationship between governance regimes are left out in the proportionality analysis-mediated resolution of regime-induced conflicts, disclosing the depoliticization tendency in inter-scalar PB. Juxtaposing it with the indicator project in international human rights advocacy, I conclude that both are jurispathic and reflect the rationalist propensity in the legal administration of global governance. PB, reconceived as a language in which values, conflicts, and interests of each governance regime can be argued and narrated as part of the politics of reconstructing global governance, will help to recast global governance in more jurisgenerative terms.
the fragmentation of international law resulting from the proliferation of special legal regimes. 3 Yet, the landscape of global governance is even more fragmented than that of international law. What threatens the unity of international law is the emergence of special legal regimes each of which has its own ethos and telos. 4 The focus of scholarship on the fragmentation of international law has been on how to steer the relations between different legal rules amidst the emergence of special legal regimes. 5 In contrast, the fragmentation of global governance results not only from the diversity of governance areas but also from the myriad actors and the corresponding 'institutional' arrangements taking part in the functioning of global governance. 6 Apart from conventional actors such as states and international organizations, individuals, corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and more informal and amorphous committees, working groups, or simply networks of experts, civil servants, and other agents cluster around issues of common concern. 7 As a result, various clusters of concerned stakeholders become institutional components, or rather, governance regimes, in the process of multivalent global governance. As the clusters of concerned stakeholders continue to increase, each governance regime is also developing its own norms, standards, codes, or autonomous 'scale' as I call it in this paper, to help to make coherent 5 See J.L. Dunoff, 'A New Approach to Regime Interaction', in Young (ed.), supra note 3, at 136, 139-44. 6 Ibid., at 137-9, 158-73. 7 A.-M. Salughter, A New World Order (2004), 131-65. governance decisions in the face of conflicting considerations. 8 Moreover, the fragmentation of governance is not just a reflection of the practical needs of transnational policymaking.
Nor is the tension between the myriad governance regimes confined to international relations. 9 Instead, as scholarship on global administrative law indicates, those myriad governance regimes are also the producers of various norms that work with formal legal rules underpinning the complex international legal order. 10 More than an application of the existing international legal doctrines to the phenomenon of global governance, to address the question of the fragmentation of global governance in legal terms can shed new light on current responses to the fragmentation of international law and beyond.
11
Notably, conflict is one of the main themes in scholarship on the fragmentation of international law.
12
Mindful of the ramifications of the emergence of special legal regimes to the international legal order, scholars have attempted to deploy canonical judicial techniques of norm conflict avoidance or traditional conflict of laws tools to address various regimeinduced conflicts, including those between general international law and special legal regimes and those concerning only the latter.
13
Depending on whether the rule conflict occurs within 8 As will be further defined, governance regimes are closely related to special legal regimes but they are not identical. Governance regimes are understood as the sites where standards, guidelines, and other norms that underpin the operation of international law, including special legal regimes, are created. 9 See generally S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983) . 10 See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 3. See also Dunoff, supra note 5, at 159. 11 See N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, 'Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order', (2006) 17 EJIL 1. 12 Young, supra note 3; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 4; G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (2012), . It is noteworthy that regime interactions are not necessarily conducted in the form of conflicts. See Dunoff, supra note 5, at . 13 a system or between distinct regimes, different traditional legal techniques of private international law have been drawn on in responding to the new conflict-of-laws question. 14 On the other hand, the proliferation of governance regimes further complicates the new conflict-of-laws question. Actor-centred governance regimes may well develop regimespecific scales, 15 even though they operate under a special legal regime. 16 It is true that regime interaction may take place in nonjudicial fora without conflicts. 17 Yet, the more regime-specific scales there are, the stronger the needs grow for inter-scalar coordination through 'conflicts of laws arrangements'.
18
Pivoting on balancing and proportionality, 19 such conflicts of laws arrangements, which are not confined to the judicial forum, add another dimension to the legal resolution of potential conflicts amidst the fragmentation of international law and the complexity of global governance.
20
14 Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn distinguish between conflicts of norms and conflicts of laws: the former refers to legal conflicts within a legal system (or a regime) whereas the latter to those between legal systems or regimes. Michaels and Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 350-1. 15 politically contested without antagonism. Facing up to the political question of inter-scalar legitimacy and its inherent subjectivity is necessary to address regime-induced conflicts in fragmented global governance.
A terminological clarification on the concept of regime is due before proceeding.
Regime is not a term of art in law. 27 Originating in IR studies, it is defined as a set of 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. Given my focus on the legal 27 Young, supra note 3, at 4. Notably, James Crawford and Penelope Nevill trace the use of the term 'regime' in international law to the nineteenth century where it referred to a 'legal framework which governed and controlled a particular area of conduct, usually concerning an area of territory'. Crawford and Nevill, supra note 13, at 258 (emphasis added 35 For this reason, a conflict between a special legal regime and general international law is still one induced by the emergence of the former, although the latter is not considered a regime in legal scholarship. See ibid., at 259. I use regime-induced conflicts rather than regime conflicts to include conflicts between regimes and those between a special legal regime and general international law. PB in resolving conflicts between IIL and the law of state immunity will be the focus of Section 2. I then take a closer look at these examples to show that regime-induced conflicts are rooted in conflicting values whose resolution lies in the political process beyond legal management in Section 3. 36 I shall argue that when formulated as a rights conflict or in terms of the balancing of rights and the public interest, regime-induced conflicts are simplified with complex fundamental issues concerning inter-scalar legitimacy concealed. As will become clear in Section 4, to counter the 'jurispathic' character of the legal management of regime conflicts, 37 the inter-scale of PB should be reconceived as a narrative framework within which the political question of inter-scalar legitimacy can be confronted. In Section 5, I conclude with a brief note on the implications of the proposed alternative understanding of PB to the global rule of law project.
Balancing regime-induced conflicts: new frontiers for proportionality
In this section, I first explain why proportionality and PB become globally attractive to At the core of the proportionality doctrine is a 'structure' under which judges adjudicate the validity of an act of public authorities in the light of the rights safeguarded in the law. 40 Focusing on the question of whether the public interest pursued by the impugned act is proportionate to the harm inflicted on the rights concerned, the key component of this reasoning structure is balancing:
if the former outweighs the latter, the impugned rights-limiting act is valid.
41
The proportionality principle is thus credited with providing a clear framework of analysis within which the reasonableness of a rights-limiting act of public authorities can be carefully examined without risking judicial arbitrariness. 42 Adopted as the principal doctrinal model in rights adjudication, proportionality analysis is presented as the prime example of global constitutionalism.
43
Notably, the appeal of PB lies in its accommodating character in the face of conflicting interests. Under the framework of proportionality analysis, rights are no longer trump cards.
Instead, they are reconceptualised as a default allocation of interests the modification of which requires special justification.
44
In this way, rights and the public policy in conflict are 'translated' into competing interests. 45 Each interest is given certain weight and then weighed against each other on a scale. That which ultimately outweighs other interests in the particular context is the one that deserves legal sanction. In this light, PB appears to be the rational 'scale', which is based on fact and free of prejudice and thus stands ready for deployment in different regimes and jurisdictions.
46
In the guise of scale, proportionality is evocative of objectivity to which the rule of law aspires. 47 Taking it further along the lines of the rational scale, some scholars suggest that PB be adopted to resolve regime-induced conflicts in global steering the inter-governance regime relations in global governance. Mindful that each governance area tends to become a distinct regime with its own rules of administration, Kingsbury ascribes regime-induced conflicts to the differing interests among the stakeholders of individual regimes and thus contends that regime-induced conflicts be resolved through some 'conflicts of laws arrangements'. 48 Notably, at the core of the 'conflicts of laws arrangements' he alludes to is the allocation of and the assessment of 'weight' among the conflicting regimes.
49 PB is thus projected beyond its traditional applications where rights are always at stake to conflicts of governance regimes.
50
It is no surprise that the proposed unconventional deployment of proportionality analysis outside the balancing of rights and public interests or conflicting rights is contentious. For example, it is questionable whether regime-specific rules and their corresponding values are comparable. Failing this condition, the global scale on which PB is premised would not obtain. 51 Yet, such criticism essentially amounts to a restatement of what has long been said of PB in its conventional deployment within the same legal order.
52
In view of PB's continuing popularity in various jurisdictions, it is not far-fetched to say that the 48 Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 55-6. 49 Ibid., at 55. incommensurability question falls far short of dampening the enthusiasm about the deployment of PB in regime-induced conflicts. As PB continues to travel across jurisdictions in spite of the foregoing scepticism, it has been considered to be 'a tool that can harmonize the relationship between …bodies of general or special international law' in the fragmented landscape of global governance. 53 And, IIL is a good example.
Proportioning regime-induced conflicts in global governance? the case of the international investment legal regime
Notably, PB has been adopted by arbitral tribunals as the doctrinal tool to reconcile the investor rights and the host state's public policy, or rather, the right to regulate in investor-state disputes. 54 On closer inspection, however, the issues clustered under the rubric of the investor rights and the host state's right to regulate are not just an expression of the conflicts between the host state's domestic law and its obligations under international law, i.e., the investment treaties with the IIL regime. Instead, they can be seen as a refraction of regime-induced conflicts and thus how they are resolved has wider implications to global governance. 65 Bjorklund notes that the provision for the enforcement of arbitral awards 'in accordance with the rules of the procedure of the territory where the award is relied on' in Article III and the public policy exception in Article V (2) (b) are susceptible to the interpretation that state immunity from enforcement is unaffected, despite variations on state practice. Ibid., at 308-9.
66 As the scope of the ICSID Convention is narrower, some investor-state arbitrations have to rely on the foregoing treaty reservation of enforcement immunities does not generally prevent the execution of arbitral awards concerning foreign investors.
67
Nevertheless, it continues to be the focus of commentary on IIL while the execution of international commercial arbitral awards itself has been brought before several tribunals arbitrating investment disputes.
68
Drawing on those arbitral awards, 69 Schill suggests that such treaty-underpinned arbitral tribunals can be the forum to address the issues of the international investment legal regime (2010) , 71, at 84-6. In this light, a parallel can be drawn between the municipal court of the forum state and 'distributed administration' in global administrative law, which means 'domestic regulatory agencies' that 'act as part of the global administrative space' and 'take decisions on issues of foreign or global concern'. See Kingsbury Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 3, at 21-2. 80 Schill, supra note 26, at 112-15. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid., at 117-18. The result is likely to move in the direction of what has been called the 'restrictive theory of immunity'. See Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 304. and the IIL special regime under the PB framework.
As the above example illustrates, domestic courts may play a role in the decentralized international investment regime.
83
It shows how the traditional international legal issues such as the relationship between general international law and special legal regimes and that between the international and municipal legal orders can be studied afresh from the perspective of global governance.
Moreover, it suggests that as PB has been tapped into for resolving the conflict between public interest and rights, there appears to be no reason to exclude regimeinduced conflicts in global governance from the application of PB, including those concerning the law of state immunity and IIL. Whether this is true is the theme to which I turn next.
In the name of law: managing politics of inter-scalar legitimacy through proportionality
Balancing occupies centre stage in the exercise of proportionality analysis. 84 For this reason, to decide whether PB analysis can provide an effective tool in resolving regimeinduced conflicts requires further assessment of how balancing works. As Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn perceptively observe, balancing functions as a conflict-resolving rule within the same legal order insomuch as each legal order presumes 'an objective standard for the respective weight of each principle' in conflict. 85 Yet, no such objective standard can be presumed across legal orders. Thus, the very absence of a common standard casts doubt on the application of PB to conflicts that extend beyond a single legal order. As suggested above, 'translation' plays a key part in the exercise of PB with respect to regime-induced conflicts.
88
This is not a phenomenon tied to cross-regime relations.
Rather, translation is a common phenomenon that has long been observed in the practice of legal interpretation. Not only does the use of comparative law require translation in the literal sense, 89 applying the statutory text to a concrete case or controversy requires translation, too. 90 The necessity of translation raises the question of 'fidelity' in legal interpretation. 91 Failing the requirement of fidelity, translation is nothing less than manipulation and interpretation blends into invention. 92 It is necessary to examine the features of the exercise of PB in the steering of regime-induced conflicts to judge whether fidelity has been lost in the translation.
The first feature of inter-scalar PB is what I call simplism. As the analytical framework of proportionality analysis indicates, competing values, whether they concern two conflicting rights or implicate public interest on the one hand and rights on the other, are the protagonists in the exercise of balancing. To fit into this framework, governance regimes in conflict need to be translated into competing values. On this view, each regime represents a predominant value. A regime-induced conflict boils down to the clash of fundamental values. That process appears to be another instance of legal practice. After all, one of the law's principal functions is to reduce the complexity of social interaction so that it can be managed through the normative frame of legal authority. 93 Yet, in inter-scalar PB, simplification takes place with respect to two sets of norms underpinning governance regimes in conflict. This suggests that simplification here is more a question of interpretation, or rather, translation, than a reduction of social complexity to legal norms. Thus, what matters is whether the translation of a governance regime into a value faithfully reflects the reality.
It is noteworthy that a governance regime not only concerns substantive values but also includes a set of secondary rules on its compliance in many instances. regime is a complex of differing values and a result of compromise and balancing at once.
Thus, to translate a multivalent governance regime into a predominant value to fit into the framework of proportionality analysis means a simplification of the intra-regime diverse values concerned. Compared to the reduction of social complexity to legal norms, which is characteristic of the law's relationship with the external environment, the operation of translation in the context of global governance as observed above would involve a double reduction: the initial reduction of social complexity into a multivalent governance regime followed by a further reduction of the latter into a predominant value. 97 Yet, thanks to simplism, PB appears to provide a handy general working framework for resolving various regime-induced conflicts.
Related to the feature of simplism is the inbuilt normative attitude towards regimeinduced conflicts when they are translated into a particular kind of questions under the framework of proportionality analysis. As indicated above, proportionality is aimed at delimiting the scope of a right in context when its exercise appears to be in clash with the public interest or another right. The translation of regime-induced conflicts into the question susceptible of proportionality analysis is a simplified conversion of a governance regime into a value, and a normative one at that, i.e., the subject of a right. Take IIL again. Foreign investment has long been considered crucial to the economic development in the less developed countries and mutually beneficial to capital-exporting countries.
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Guided by the 97 With such a double move of reduction, the issues concerning the opaqueness of global governance are likely to be further aggravated. 98 The third feature, which I term 'institutionalism', has less to do with PB itself than the identity of its object of measurement in regime-induced conflicts. I have noted in Section 1 that the fragmented landscape of global governance results not only from the development of individual treaty regimes in the international legal order but also from the profusion of formal and informal institutional arrangements in global administration. 102 Seen in this light, the unit that is involved in the regime-induced conflict is not limited to a self-contained treaty regime. 103 Rather, as indicated in Section 1, regime-induced conflicts also take place between the myriad formal and informal institutional arrangements of global governance. Thus, units 393 . 99 ICSID Convention Article 27 (1). 100 J.W. Salacuse, 'The Emerging Global Regime for Investment', (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 427, at 446-8. 101 Even when issues concerning the law of state immunity are brought up before the investor-state arbitral tribunal, they are likely to be subsumed under the concept of the host state's right to regulate, although it is more of sovereignty than right. Cf. Mouyal, supra note 54, at 79-80. 102 For the idea of global administration and its role in the analysis of global governance, see Kingsbury Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 3, at 18-27. 103 See also Simma and Pulkowski, supra note 3, at 490-4.
in regime-induced conflicts include those institutional arrangements in the administration of global governance, regardless of whether they belong to the same treaty regime. This focus on institution bears greatly on the deployment of PB to regime-induced conflicts. As discussed above, the exercise of PB rests on the identification of a distinct value with each unit involved in a conflict. As the units in a regime-induced conflict turn out to be the institutional arrangements, the focus will be more on the identification of the predominant value emitted from each institutional entity than on the discovery of a distinctive value in each self-contained treaty regime. Notably, Kingsbury suggests that with no global 'public' in sight, the idea of the public in global governance should be understood in a diffuse way as each institutional 'entity' together with the stakeholders centring around it constitutes a 'public', 104 reflecting the feature of institutionalism. The 'conflict of laws arrangement', which he proposes to govern the relations between governance regimes, amounts to an 'inter-public law', or rather, an inter-regime law. 105 Thus, institutionalism is characteristic of inter-scalar PB in that its object of measurement extends to the institutional entities of global governance.
'Legalism' is the fourth feature of the inter-scale of PB. As the feature of institutionalism suggests, what is characteristic of the approach of PB to regime-induced conflicts is its association of conflicts with the diffuse publics organized around individual institution-pivoted governance regimes. Each governance regime brings a cluster of stakeholders to itself and becomes a public and a unit of conflict in global governance. Seen in this light, regime-induced conflicts result from the disagreement between individual clusters of stakeholders with respect to the governance matters that implicate multiple regimes. To put it bluntly, regime-induced conflicts are reflective of the politics playing out among the stakeholders in global governance. 106 Against this backdrop, PB appears to be a legal means to tame politics as it provides a legal framework within which politics can be recast. 107 Reining in politics through law is surely a noble dream worth pursuing. Yet, as Alexander
Somek perceptively observes, in the exercise of PB, 'one is left with a constitutional conception that reaches out, at bottom, beyond law'.
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Even so, efforts have been made to reduce PB's value-laden character so much so that it is even expressed through an economics-inspired 'indifference curve' 109 or presented as a 'formula', 110 suggesting the legal objectivity to which it aspires. 111 Thus, the enchantment of PB is not so much about the legal solution it ostensibly provides as about the legal image it emits. Through this lens of legalism, the political issues at the core of the relations between governance regimes such as diverse values, differing policy goals, and distinct interests are recast as legal questions in inter-scalar PB.
112
The four features-simplism, normativism, institutionalism, and legalism-raise fundamental issues about fidelity and beyond in the emerging adoption of PB as the inter-scale for regime-induced conflicts. As noted above, framing the question of regime-induced conflicts as one susceptible of PB requires translation, and fidelity is the lynchpin of translation. Yet, the double reduction of the social complexity to a governance regime and the latter further to a predominant value (simplism), the inbuilt normative inclination in the rights-oriented framing of conflicts (normativism), and the juridification of policy issues (legal objectivism) indicate that what is reflected in the analysis of PB is a refracted image of what is really going on between conflicting governance regimes. 113 As a result, inter-scalar PB fails to reflect fully the complexity of competing interests in regime-induced conflicts. gains better access to governance regimes and is thus included as stakeholder. 115 the status of stakeholder is the stepping-stone to the decision-making process through which the predominant value or interest of a governance regime is given expression. Together with normativism and legal objectivism, institutionalism works to simplify the complexity of political issues such as the definition of global publics and the delimitation of governance regimes. 116 As a result, the inter-scale of PB ostensibly depoliticizes the operation of global governance, only risking obscuring global governance even more. 
From technique of inter-scale to narrative of global governance: proportionality reconceived
The seemingly apolitical and objective inter-scale of PB is more than a trait of the steering of regime-induced conflicts. It is also a symptom of the legal administration of global governance. I hasten to add that the quest for objectivity has long been characteristic of the rule of law. Yet, legal objectivity is only plausible within a common political space. 118 In the face of the transboundary character of contemporary governance issues and the fragmented political landscape of global administration, attempts to engender legal objectivity look to global 'scales', generic 'benchmarks', or numerical 'indicators' for the solution. 119 These are considered the way out of the political thicket of global governance, and towards legal objectivity without a common political space, as they transcend locality, exemplify universality, and are value-free in the eyes of the public. 120 The propensity towards legal objectivity as expressed in PB is reflective of a broad phenomenon in global governance and IHRL is a case in point. Let us take a closer look at the international human rights regime. One of the principal issues in the implementation of IHRL is the generality and abstractness of rights.
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Despite the commentary the treaty bodies have issued on the provisions of human rights treaties, its legal effect is not without question.
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It is also doubtful that a one-size-fits-all interpretation from a distant treaty body can apply to all societies the world over. Moreover, domestic implementing authorities with economic, technological, cultural, and social differences rarely arrive at the same rendering in the interpretation of a human right. 123 As a result, efforts to put teeth into the international human rights regime by means of treaty codification only yield limited results. 124 Seen in this light, it is not hard to understand why the international human rights movement stalls when it comes to implementation and enforcement. As the history of national struggles for rights indicates, the realization of human rights is always entwined with politics. 125 Negotiated compromise is central to politics and cannot be dictated from the top or from afar. It is a product of local politics and social dialogue. The politics of human rights is no exception. 126 To reach a uniform rendering through the complex and dynamic discursive politics in a pluralist world is a tall order. For this reason, IHRL suffers from the lack of clear standards and concrete prescriptions, weakening both its legal effect and practical impact. 127 Thus, along with the barriers arising from the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, the lack of clarity poses another challenge to the global implementation and promotion of human rights. Against this backdrop began the move towards 'techniques' in the 1990s. 128 It was argued that, by turning to indicators, benchmarks, and statistical measurements, advocates for human rights could focus on the seemingly neutral, demonstrable statistics, and league tables and thus 'bypass' the complicated local politics in the quest for legal objectivity despite the lack of political consensus. 129 In this way, the international human rights legal regime could seek to influence the behaviours of local actors without direct intervention, i.e.
'govern at a distance'. 130 With the focus shifting from treaty interpretation to measurable monitoring, IHRL was thus cloaked with objectivity, uniformity, and certainty. The 'indicator project' at the core of international human rights advocacy enhances the legal status and practical impact of the international human right regime, 131 suggesting the resurgence of the undying idea of nonhuman law. 132 To be clear, the inter-scale of PB is not just a statistical exercise and the element of judgment cannot be completely taken out of equation. 133 Instead, its juxtaposition with the indicator project reveals that the emphasis on the resolution or management of regime-induced conflicts by virtue of legal objectivity reflects the general unease about the political uncertainty and complexity in the administration of global governance. In the legal response to the politics of the interaction between governance regimes, PB stands out for the aura of reason, objectivity, and neutrality, with which the image of proportionality as a scale is associated and to which the law aspires. 134 The adoption of PB as the legal inter-scale of regime-induced conflicts shares the rationalist propensity in the pursuit of techniques of indicators, benchmarks, and statistical measurements in international human rights advocacy. 135 If so, is this a welcome development in the global rule of law project? Before answering that question, let us take IHRL again. One fundamental criticism about the rationalist propensity in the international human rights regime's continuing pursuit for more accurate benchmarks and more sophisticated indicators is its shadowing effect on the reality and complexity of global governance. Disguised in value-free numerals, these new techniques of governance seem to be able to dodge politics. 136 Out of this comes the apolitical character of the indicator project. Seen in this light, the indicator project appears to be free of value judgment and policy choice, embodying the 'sovereignty of technique'. 137 Yet, it is also for its politics-averse techniques that the indicator project is accused of 'diminishing moral discourse in human rights' and keeping the contestation about the implementation of IHRL from the 'conversation of human societies'. 138 The depoliticization criticism of the rationalist propensity of the indicatory project sheds illuminating light on the deployment of PB in resolving regime-induced conflicts. As the four features in the inter-scale of PB shows, the politics of regime-induced conflicts is reframed in terms of issues to be addressed through legal reasoning. This does not mean that the legal expression of the politics of regime-induced conflicts in global governance is meant to dodge politics in the way the indicator project does. Yet, the legal language of inter-scalar PB does
give the resolution of regime-induced conflicts a veneer of objectivity, certainty, and reason.
And, these seemingly 'scientific' properties are PB's charm to those concerned about regimeinduced conflicts. 139 On this view, the inter-scale of PB and the indicator project converge on their politics-averse character. As it turns out, the enthusiasm about the inter-scale of PB suggests the attempt to substitute science for politics as the legitimate foundation for the management of regime-induced conflicts.
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In sum, although PB is neither rid of politics nor meant to be so, politics in the guise of PB is obscured.
I have noted in Section 3 that PB within the same legal order pivots on the assumed objective value, which guarantees its efficacy and legitimacy. The assumption of an objective value further rests on the premise that members of a common place that bring forth the legal order can subscribe to a common value on account of shared culture, history, and mores as well as interest.
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This community-embedded premise is foundational to the legitimacy of balancing. 142 When balancing extends beyond a single legal order, that premise falters and the legitimacy of balancing is plunged into contestation.
Once the political underpinnings of inter-scalar PB are uncovered, its legitimacy as the inter-scale of regime-induced conflicts cannot be presumed but rather becomes contested.
Parrying contestation, inter-scalar PB only asserts legitimacy in the steering of regime-induced conflicts in the name of law's reason, certainty, and objectivity. The role of judgment, bias, tactical alliance, and other less normative factors underpinning the formation of regimespecific rules and the coordination of legal regimes in global governance are thus obscured, 146 worsening the legitimacy problem of global governance. The inter-scale of regime-induced conflicts amounts to resolving the politics about legitimacy into the law of PB. Although the inter-scale of PB may help to decide the applicable law in each instance of regime-induced conflict, it is not 'jurisgenerative'. 147 On the contrary, the legal 'resolution' of regimeinduced conflicts in global governance is 'jurispathic' as the applicable law resulting from the exercise of PB results from a managerial lawmaking process. 148 To be sure, the lawmaking process embedded in the management of regime-induced conflicts is political. Yet, the politics in the lawmaking of governance regimes is hardly an inclusive discursive politics but rather confined to its direct stakeholders, despite its impact on people other than those centring on individual regimes. 149 If so, what can we expect of PB in the steering of regime-induced conflicts?
To answer this question, let us first rewind a bit and recall PB in its conventional form.
It is noteworthy that although proportionality and balancing have become a popular legal language, their overtones of analogy suggest that they have long been common factors in the making of everyday decisions in the human society. 150 Adopted as a judicial language,
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PB is widely embraced for empowering the court to take hard look at constitutional issues resulting from conflicting claims on solid grounds of legitimacy. Appealing to the rationalist PB, the lawmaking court speaks the language of authority and is shielded from accusations of judicial interventionism when setting aside the political branch's policy. 152 Yet, PB is effective only thanks to the authority conferred on the court. It is the final say the court has over the legality or constitutionality of policies that brings forth the sense of certitude about the exercise of PB. 153 In this light, the emphasis on the legal character of inter-scalar PB among its advocates is misplaced. In the absence of an effectual central international judicial body, the hope that PB will play the role of a new conflict-resolving rule in the legal administration of global governance seems to be dimmed. 154 To reconceive the role of PB in regime-induced conflicts, it needs to be freed from the conflict of laws thinking and disentangled from the quest for the objective inter-scale.
As its supporters have observed, PB does not necessarily end up being politics-averse as discussed above. Rather, it serves as the framework within which politically contested issues can be argued about and resolved through practical reasoning. 155 In this way, law tames politics without colonizing it. This political and practical reading of PB merits close
attention. Yet, it does not go far enough, especially when it is deployed in the decentralized global order with no authoritative judicial body sitting on the top. 156 Failing to disclose the distinctive political setting in full, appealing to practical reasoning conceals rather than tames the politics of inter-scalar PB.
As noted above, inter-scalar PB, as it is, points to a jurispathic lawmaking, which does the global rule of law project a disservice. As Robert Cover powerfully argued, narratives, instead of precepts, are what make the common political space jurisgenerative and turns the corresponding legal order into a nomos, a normative world enriched with meanings we inhabit. 157 To engender a jurisgenerative global rule of law, narratives have a role to play in the management of regime-induced conflicts in global governance. Extending beyond their roots in literature, narratives have been a major tool of IR scholars in the reconstruction of international politics. 158 For example, 'strategic narratives' are considered important to reshape the international order. 159 In this light, to fully uncover the political character of regime-induced conflicts, PB can be reconceived as a constructive narrative framework within which the political question of inter-scalar legitimacy can be confronted. Viewed thus, the inter-scale of PB should not be expected to yield legally authoritative results. Rather, any conclusion from it should be treated as provisional, subject to further modification. In this way, inter-scalar PB is not so much a scale as a platform. Its function is to bring all competing factors in regime-induced conflicts together for contestation instead of deciding which governance regime has more 'weight'. On this view, who is to be included in the platform should remain open and be constantly contested. The conflicting interests of stakeholders, other interested parties, and the regime-specific institutions can thus come to the fore in the ongoing debate about the relationship between governance regimes in global governance.
Moreover, the compatibility question that haunts PB can be unveiled and tackled head-on.
Under this new understanding, the inter-scale of PB provides a language in which values, conflicts, and interests of each regime can be argued, narrated, and provisionally resolved as part of the politics of reforming and constructing global governance. In this way, PB is instrumental in the 'jurisgenesis' of regime-induced conflicts and global governance.
Conclusion
The question of regime-induced conflicts looms large in the fragmented landscape of global governance. PB, the darling of legal academics and practitioners for the past thirty years or so, finds its new calling in the legal resolution of regime-induced conflicts. In this Regime-induced conflicts and the response as discussed in the paper illustrate the character of the rule of law project. Under this project, law is seen as the antidote to political anarchy. The history of domestic legal development is one of struggling to tame politics with the law. 160 Domesticating the anarchic international politics has also driven the development of modern international law. 161 The legal administration of global governance is another chapter to the long story of fighting political anarchy with the law. 162 Calls for resolving regime-induced conflicts through PB echo this rationalist tradition.
Yet, as I have pointed out, the rationalist propensity gives short shrift to the complexity of global governance and other rule of law projects. The derogatory terms such as legalistic, managerial, jurispathic, to name but a few, give expression to the dissatisfaction with the state of the global rule of law project. To make the global rule of law into a process of jurisgenesis, we need to face up to the fundamental question of its legitimacy and the underlying political conflicts. 163 PB, reconceived as a language in which values, conflicts, and interests of each governance regime can be argued and narrated as part of the politics of reconstructing global governance, is a jurisgenerative step towards rethinking the meaning of the global rule of law.
43-54. 163 See also Klabbers, supra note 36, at 227.
